Global Energy Review

Energy Security in the EU: Finding new Sources of Natural Gas

A Report by Dr Paul McDonald
Consulting Editor, Oil and Energy Trends

Contents

List of Tables

Introduction

Introduction

The EU has become increasingly concerned about its heavy reliance on Russia for imports of natural gas. Of the 28.9 bn cfd net imports in 2008, some 13.6 bn cfd, or 47%, came from Russia. In some cases, Russia accounts for all the gas imported by individual countries.

(* Of the gross imports identified in Tables 2 and 16, Russia accounted for 35%.)

The EU’s concerns arise to a considerable extent from a succession of disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the price to be paid by Ukraine for Russian supplies of gas. The Ukrainians have been reluctant to agree to the annual increase in prices in recent years. The Russians have responded by temporarily cutting off gas supplies. Ukraine has retaliated by diverting Russian gas intended for customers in the EU for its own use. Since these disputes have taken place at the turn of the calendar year, the EU countries affected have found themselves short of gas during the peak winter demand season.

The situation is greatly complicated by the deteriorating political relations between the EU and Russia. Moscow has become increasingly irritated by what it sees as the EU’s support for political parties in Ukraine that it regards as anti-Russian.

Russia maintains that the supply of gas to the EU is conducted solely on a commercial basis. It has further begun to promote and build new gas export pipelines serving the EU that by-pass Ukraine completely. The EU nevertheless remains wary of Russia and is pursuing other import schemes of its own to bring in gas from a variety of other sources.

Amongst the options being pursued are major new gas pipelines from the Caspian, the Middle East and Africa. The EU is also seeking further supplies of LNG. Russia, though, is responding by trying to secure some of this gas for its own export pipeline network and is even planning new pipelines of its own to serve the EU.

The EU has responded too slowly to these moves by Russia.  In recent months it has tried to speed up plans for a pipeline from the Caspian that is independent of Russia; but it may well have left it too late.  It is now therefore looking seriously at ambitious plans to bring in gas from other areas, including Africa and the Middle East.  These may nevertheless not prove sufficient to enable the EU to reduce its reliance on gas produced or controlled by Moscow.

EU Gas Supplies

Gas Balance

The European Union produces 18.4 bn cfd of natural gas and consumes 47.3 bn cfd, making it a net importer of 28.9 bn cfd (see Table 1).  Domestic production has declined by 4.1 bn cfd since 2001, when it peaked at 22.5 bn cfd.  Over the same period the EU’s consumption has risen by 3.7 bn cfd.

The EU’s production is in long-term decline.  Its proven reserves of 101.4 trillion cf are sufficient for only 15 years’ production at 2008 levels of production.  Furthermore, they account for only 1.6% of the world total, compared with the EU’s 16.2% share of global consumption
Table 1
EU: Gas Profile, 2008
Proven Reserves 101.4 trillion cf
Years remaining * 15
(bn cfd)
Production 18.4
Consumption 47.3
Net Imports 28.9
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Energy Security

The EU is becoming increasingly worried about its heavy reliance on Russia for imports of natural gas.  With domestic output in decline and demand forecast to rise, the EU is faced with the need to rely increasingly on imports.  Its principal existing external suppliers are Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya–all of which supply the EU by pipeline–and Trinidad & Tobago, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Nigeria–which supply it with liquefied natural gas.

Of these suppliers, Russia is by far the most dominant.  The 13.6 bn cfd it was contracted to deliver in 2008 is equivalent to 29% of the EU’s total consumption of natural gas and 47% of the EU’s net imports during the same year (see Tables 1 and 2).  In the case of several countries, Russia’s share of the import total is even higher.  In 12 of the 27 member countries, Russia accounted for over 70% of total gas imports, whilst in six–Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Slovakia–the Russian share is close to 100% (see Table 2).

Gas consumption in the EU has risen steadily over the last decade.  In a number of cases this has come about as a result of substitution by gas for other fuels.  Between 1998 and 2008, the EU’s primary energy consumption increased by 2.3%.  Gas consumption over the same period went up by 18.3%.

Oil consumption, on the other hand, fell by 0.6%, whilst demand for coal declined by 6.9%.  The consumption of hydro-electric power went down by even more: by 10.5%.  Apart from gas the only other source of primary energy to record an increase between 1998 and 2008 was nuclear power, where the rise over the decade as a whole was 1.0%

OET ARCHIVE:

HYPER-LINKS:

Table 2
EU: Gross Pipeline Imports, 2008

Country

Total Imports

Russian Share

(bn cfd)

(%)

Austria

0.8

72

Belgium

1.8

—

Bulgaria

0.3

100

Czech Republic

0.8

77

Finland

0.4

100

France

3.5

24

Germany

8.4

42

Greece

0.3

88

Hungary

1.1

77

Ireland

0.5

—

Italy

7.3

33

Lithuania

0.3

100

Luxembourg

0.1

—

Netherlands

1.7

24

Poland

0.9

73

Portugal

0.2

—

Romania

0.4

78

Slovakia

0.5

100

Spain

1.0

—

United Kingdom

3.4

—

Others

0.2

63

Total

33.9

36
Totals rounded
Figures refer to contracted volumes.  Actual deliveries may differ
Volumes listed above include intra-EU trades
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

HYPER-LINK:

http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME

Declining Production

The EU produces less than 40% of the gas it consumes.  Its production is equivalent to 6% of the world total, whereas its consumption amounts to 16% of world demand.  The contrast with reserves is even greater: the EU’s proven reserves amount to just over 1% of the world total.

The EU’s gas production is also concentrated in two countries–Great Britain and the Netherlands–which between them account for 72% of its total production.  Moreover of the principal EU gas producers, only two–Denmark and the Netherlands–are net exporters.  The largest producer, Great Britain, exports about 1 bn cfd to other parts of the EU, but is actually a net importer of more than twice that amount (see Table 3).

Gas production in Great Britain is in long-term decline, having peaked at 10.5 bn cfd in 2008.  Last year’s total of 6.7 bn cfd was 36% lower than at its peak.  Production in the Netherlands is just under 2% less than in 2004, but does seem to have stabilized around 6.5 bn cfd for the time-being.

Table 3
EU: Principal Gas Producers, 2008

Country

Production

Net Trade

(bn cfd)

(bn cfd)

United Kingdom

6.7

(2.3)

Netherlands

6.5

2.8

Germany

1.3

(6.7)

Romania

1.1

(0.3)

Denmark

1.0

0.5

Italy

0.8

(6.7)

Poland

0.4

(0.9)

Others

0.6

(15.3)

Total

18.4

(28.9)
Totals rounded
Source: GER calculation based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

The Netherlands is clearly in a better position in terms of reserves than any other EU gas producer. Its reserves:production ratio is a healthy 21:1. Romania and Poland both have higher ratios (see Table 4) but their production is much lower (see Table 3).

Reserves are nevertheless only part of the story. Production for the EU as a whole is evidently in long-term decline. The peak was reached in 2001, at 22.5 bn cfd. Since then it has fallen by 18% to its current total around 18.4 bn cfd.  Much of the decline may be attributed to the fall in British production. With the Netherlands showing no sign of wishing to increase its output substantially–thanks to the conservative depletion policies adopted there for many years–the EU is likely to see a continuing decline in output.  Imports are likely to rise as a result.

Table 4
EU: Proven Gas Reserves, 2008

Country

Reserves

Years Remaining*

(trillion cf)

 

Netherlands

49.1

21

Romania

22.2

55

United Kingdom

12.1

5

Germany

4.2

9

Italy

4.2

14

Poland

3.9

27

Denmark

1.9

6

Others

3.8

6

Total

101.4

15
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Import Options

Russian Exports

Russia’s contracted exports to the EU amounted to 13.6 bn cfd in 2008, which is the equivalent of 47% of the EU’s net imports of gas and 29% of its total consumption of gas.  Russia completely dominates the European continent in terms of reserves, production and exports.  Output of 58.0 bn cfd and demand of 40.5 bn cfd give it net exports of 17.5 bn cfd.  It also has proven reserves of 1,529 trillion cf: sufficient for 72 years’ production at existing levels (see Table 5).

Russia is also important in world terms.  It is the largest producer in the world and its proven reserves are also the world’s largest.  In 2008, it accounted for a fifth of global output and its reserves are nearly one quarter of the world total.

Table 5
Russia: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

1,529.2 trillion cf

Years remaining *

72

 

(bn cfd)

Production

58.0

Consumption

40.5

Net Exports

17.5
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Its reserves and production, however, tell only part of the story.  Russia is also an important conduit for natural gas from a number of important producers in the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia.  Using the pipeline network that was built by the Soviet Union, it is able to deliver gas from the Caspian region and beyond to the EU, potentially giving it an even greater role in the EU’s energy balance.  This explains the EU’s current attempts to persuade countries bordering the Caspian to send their gas to Europe using different routes.

The problem for the EU is that the routes it wants the Caspian gas producers to use do not yet exist, whereas Russia can and does already transport gas from the Caspian to consumers in Western Europe.  The EU is belatedly trying to promote a series of east-west pipelines, but is so far struggling to find sufficient gas to fill them.

OET ARCHIVE LINK: ‘Russia ties-up more oil and gas’, Focus, Feb 08

HYPER-LINKS:

Table 6
EU: Future Import Routes

Route

Pipeline

Capacity

Potential Sources of Gas

On-stream

(bn cfd)

Russia-Bulgaria-Europe

South Stream

4.5

Russia

2013

Russia-Germany

Nord Stream

2.7

Russia

2011

Turkey-Austria

Nabucco

3.0

Iraq; Iran; Caspian

2015-16

Turkey-Greece-Italy

TAP

1.0

Iran

2010

Turkey-Greece-Italy

ITGI

1.0

Caspian

2012

Greece-Austria

West Balkan

1.0

Caspian

TBD

Egypt-Levant-Europe

AGP

1.0

Middle East

TBD

Nigeria-Algeria-Spain

TSGP

2.0-3.0

Nigeria; Algeria

2015

 

Total

16.2-17.2

 

 
Volumes and dates subject to change
TBD: to be decided
TAP: Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
ITGI: Interconnector Turkey Greece Italy
AGP: Arab Gas Pipeline
TSGP: Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline

HYPER-LINK:

Gas from Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has 42.3 trillion cf of proven reserves–sufficient for 81 years–and is a net exporter (see Table 7).  As the most westerly of the Caspian gas producers, Azerbaijan has attracted the most attention of all the former Soviet republics from the EU.  It already exports its oil without the need of a pipeline through Russia.  The EU is promoting a similar idea for the import of gas from Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan is seen as a major supplier of gas to the EU’s proposed Nabucco pipeline: a 3 bn cfd line designed to deliver gas to Central Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (see Table 6).  The project is a partnership between Turkey’s Botas, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz, Romania’s Transgaz, Hungary’s MOL, Austria’s OMV and RWE of Germany.  On 13th July, 2009, the five transit countries signed an intergovernmental agreement setting out the legal framework for the operation of the line.

Azerbaijan’s gas comes mainly from the Shah Deniz field in the Caspian, which is operated by BP.  Shah Deniz will also be the principal source of any additional supplies.  A second phase of Shah Deniz is already planned, but its development has been delayed.  First gas was due originally in 2014.  A date of 2015 was subsequently proposed, but sources in Azerbaijan suggest 2016 as the first feasible date for the commissioning of Shah Deniz-II.  Nabucco was originally supposed to open in 2012.

Azeri sources also suggest that a major reason for the delays is the uncertainty over export markets for the gas.  At present, there appear to be four main export options:

Assuming Shah Deniz-II starts producing in 2016, it should have about 1.5 bn cfd available for export when it reaches full production, probably in 2019.  Potential markets are as follows:

Further, small volumes might be supplied to Georgia.

It is clear from the above that the potential demand for gas from Shah Deniz-II greatly exceeds its likely production–even at peak levels.  Until a decision is made about the markets and volumes, there can be no final development plan for Shah Deniz-II.

The EU authorities appear confident that Nabucco will be able to receive some 800 mn cfd, but this is unlikely to be sufficient to allow the 3 bn cfd project to go ahead.  More gas will need to be sourced from elsewhere and then tied in to the building of the pipeline.  The other possible sources for Nabucco include Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

OET ARCHIVE LINK: ‘Exports from Azerbaijan’, Focus, Apr 09

HYPER-LINKS:

Table 7
Azerbaijan: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

42.3 trillion cf

Years remaining *

81

 

(bn cfd)

Production

1.4

Consumption

0.9

Net Exports

0.5
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is an important gas producer in terms of reserves and potential production.  Its proven reserves of 64.4 trillion cf are sufficient for 60 years at 2008’s levels of production.  It is also a net exporter of 900 mn cfd (see Table 8).

As with Azerbaijan, there is some uncertainty over the timetable for developing future gas reserves and over possible markets for the gas.  BG and ENI have a large field at Karachaganak, with estimated reserves of 16 trillion cf, and which produces about 1.2 bn cfd, and for which there are plans for a further 1.2 bn cfd.  The expansion has been held up, however, by arguments between the companies and the Kazakh government over the high cost of the fields.

Kazakhstan exports gas to Russia and China at present and these seem the most likely destinations for any additional supplies of gas in future.  The government has suggested that gas might also be available for the EU, but this may be little more than a bargaining ploy to be used in negotiations with the Russians.

Kazakh government forecasts are for an output level of 6.8 bn cfd by 2016, but this represents a reduction of 12% over previous forecasts.  This could give it an export surplus of about 4.5 bn cfd; but China could easily absorb more than half of this.  Any exports going westwards would require new pipeline links: either to Russia or to proposed lines to the EU, such as Nabucco.  Geography suggests that Kazakhstan will increase capacity on existing links to Russia–to which it is adjacent–rather than building longer pipeline links to Nabucco and similar lines, which would probably require a new pipeline under the Caspian.

OET ARCHIVE LINK: ‘Kazakhs cut output forecast’, Focus, Jan 08

Table 8
Kazakhstan: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

64.4 trillion cf

Years remaining *

60

 

(bn cfd)

Production

2.9

Consumption

2.0

Net Exports

0.9
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan has the largest estimated proven reserves of all the former Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian Soviet republics.  It is also the region’s principal exporter, with apparent net exports of 4.6 bn cfd (see Table 9).  Most of its gas is sold to Russia.  There is also a small export trade with Iran.

Turkmenistan has plans to increase production considerably.  A figure as high as 15.5 bn cfd has been quoted, which would represent an increase on 2008’s figure of 158%.  In the absence of firm development plans, however, this figure must be viewed as highly speculative.

In any case, most Turkmen plans for exports cover Russia and China; not the EU.  These include a 4 bn cfd pipeline to China via Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and a new 8 bn cfd link with Russia.  There are also plans for a pipeline to the Indian sub-continent via Afghanistan, though these are somewhat theoretical at present given the political and military situation in Afghanistan.

Table 9
Turkmenistan: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

280.6 trillion cf

Years remaining *

122

 

(bn cfd)

Production

6.4

Consumption

1.8

Net Exports

4.6
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is an important producer of gas, but it also has the largest consumption of any of the Central Asian countries (see Table 10).  As the most easterly of these countries, it is the least-likely potential supplier to Western Europe.

Uzbek gas plans concentrate mainly on increasing domestic industrial use of gas, including plans for gas-to-liquids production, and on selling more to Russia.  There have also been discussions about supplying China.  The EU does not appear anywhere in current Uzbek plans.

Table 10
Uzbekistan: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

55.8 trillion cf

Years remaining *

25

 

(bn cfd)

Production

6.0

Consumption

4.7

Net Exports

1.3
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Gas from the Middle East

Faced with the difficulties of securing extra gas from former Soviet republics, the EU has recently begun to examine the possibility of sourcing supplies from Iraq and other parts of the Middle East.  The aim appears to be to build feeder pipelines from the south to link up with the Nabucco pipeline in Turkey.

Iraq

Whilst Iraq has impressive reserves–112 trillion cf: sufficient for 235 years at current rates–it does not export any gas at present (see Table 11).  Its gas production is nearly all produced in association with oil and is concentrated in the south of the country (see Table 12).

What would be required for exports to Europe would be one or more large, new non-associated gasfields in the north of the country in order both to provide a supply independent of oil production levels and to minimize the length of the feeder pipeline to Nabucco.  Whilst there are such undeveloped reserves, Iraq has as yet no firm plans for their development.

Baghdad is likely to develop its gas industry in stages, starting with the domestic market.  Any exports are likely to go initially to nearby countries, such as Syria and Turkey, rather than to Europe.  It is also possible that Iraq will export LNG via the Persian Gulf rather than export by pipeline to the EU.

OET ARCHIVE LINK: ‘EU seeks gas amid Iraqi confusion’, Focus, Aug 09

Table 11
Iraq: Gas Profile, 2008

Reserves*

112 trillion cf

Years remaining†

235

 

(bn cfd)

Production

1.3

Consumption

1.3

Net Trade

0.0
Totals rounded
* Proven reserves as at 1.1.09
† Based on 2008’s production
Source:  (Reserves) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009
(Other) Pearl Oil estimate
Table 12
Iraq: Gas Production, 2008

 

(bn cfd)

Iraq

 

Northern Fields

0.1

Southern Fields

1.1

Total

1.2

Kurdistan

 

Total

0.1

Iraq & Kurdistan

 

Total

1.3
Totals rounded
Source: Country data

Iran

Iran has also been seen as a possible supplier of gas to Nabucco or other pipelines to the EU.  Whilst it has considerable potential in terms of its reserves, it has failed so far to establish a significant export business (see Table 13).  Moreover plans to develop more than 20 bn cfd of new production from the giant South Pars field have fallen considerably behind schedule, and there is further uncertainty over any gas exports because of EU opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme and the possibility of future trade sanctions by the EU.

OET ARCHIVE LINK: ‘Iran tries again on South Pars’, Gas & Power, Aug09

HYPER-LINK:

Table 13
Iran: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

1,045.7 trillion cf

Years remaining *

255

 

(bn cfd)

Production

11.2

Consumption

11.3

Net Imports

0.1
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Egypt

There have even been proposals to import Egyptian gas to the EU via the gas transmission system being proposed for the Levant, which would deliver Egyptian gas as far north as Syria, from where a link to Nabucco could be constructed.  Egypt appears to have the potential in terms of reserves to increase its output and exports (see Table 14), but it is likely to prefer to increase LNG exports rather than supply Europe by a pipeline via Turkey.

Table 14
Egypt: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

76.6 trillion cf

Years remaining *

37

 

(bn cfd)

Production

5.7

Consumption

3.9

Net Exports

1.8
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

EU looks further afield

With so much uncertainty over future gas supplies from the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, the EU is now looking further afield: notably to West Africa.  In July 2009, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria agreed to promote a new pipeline through the three countries and across the Mediterranean to the EU.  A 2-3 bn cfd line is proposed, stretching for more than 2,500 miles across the Sahara.

Both Nigeria and Algeria are important producers and exporters of gas.  They also have large proven reserves (see Tables 15 & 16) indicating potential for an increase in exports.  Algeria is a much more likely source of additional gas for the EU, given existing plans to develop new gasfields, which would give it exports in the region of 10 bn cfd by 2015.

The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) is only planned to run as far as Algeria.  Nigeria would then rely on Algeria’s trans-Mediterranean pipelines to deliver its gas into the EU.  Given Algeria’s existing plans for expansion it is doubtful that it would have much spare capacity in its export pipelines to accommodate gas from Nigeria as well.  A separate Nigerian link to the European continent would, on the other hand, add considerably to the cost of the TSGP.

Table 15
Algeria: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

159.1 trillion cf

Years remaining *

52

 

(bn cfd)

Production

8.3

Consumption

2.4

Net Exports

5.9
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009
Table 16
Nigeria: Gas Profile, 2008

Proven Reserves

184.2 trillion cf

Years remaining *

148

 

(bn cfd)

Production

3.4

Consumption

1.4

Net Exports

2.0
Totals rounded
* Based on 2008’s production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

The Search continues

The EU imports gas both by pipeline (see Table 2) and as LNG (see Table 17).  Pipeline imports, however, are nearly seven times larger than those of LNG, and most future import schemes are for pipelines rather than new LNG capacity.

A fall in consumption since 2005 has given the EU some breathing space in its search for new sources of gas, but it is likely to need one or more large new import deals from about 2015.  On present evidence, there is unlikely to be much additional gas from the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia or the Middle East at about that time, leaving Algeria and Russia as the main incremental suppliers.  Algeria could have up to 4 bn cfd of additional gas for export between 2015 and 2020.  There might be some additional LNG as well.

Table 17
EU: Gross LNG Imports, 2008

Source

Volume

 

(bn cfd)

Algeria

1.5

Nigeria

1.3

Qatar

0.8

Egypt

0.6

Trinidad & Tobago

0.5

Norway

0.1

Others

0.1

Total

4.9
Totals rounded
Figures refer to contracted volumes.  Actual deliveries may differ
Volumes listed above include re-exports from EU
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2009

Outlook to 2020

Between 1998 and 2008, the EU’s gas consumption grew by 1.7% annually.  If this rate were to be repeated over the next 11 years, the situation in 2020 would be as follows, compared with 2009:

 

2009

2020

Change

 

 

(bn cfd)

 

Demand

47

57

10

Production

18

11

(7)

Net Imports

29

46

17

The EU’s options to meet the forecast total of imports in 2020 would appear to be as follows:

 

(bn cfd)

Non-Russian Sources

 

North Africa

10

Norway

10

other

5

Total

25

Deficit to be met by Russia

 

Total

21
(Volumes include LNG)

Under this scenario, Russia would continue to account for just over 45% of the EU’s net imports, but the volume imported from Russia would rise by about 8 bn cfd, or 62%.  As now, some of the gas actually delivered by Russia would be gas produced in Central Asia and bought by Gazprom for sale to Western Europe.  In fact, the volume of Central Asian gas delivered to the EU via the Russian pipeline system would probably increase.  Russia might even buy gas from Azerbaijan for export via its own pipelines to the EU.

The EU therefore looks most unlikely to be able to reduce its reliance on gas delivered via Russia between now and 2020.  Russia has proved far more adept than the EU Commission and its commercial partners in signing up future gas supplies.  Its plans for new pipeline links are also much more advanced (see Table 6).

Does Russia have the Gas?

There nevertheless remains the question of whether Russia can supply all the additional gas that the EU is likely to need from its own fields. Its main Western Siberian fields are in decline–except for the Zapolyarnoe field–and there have been delays in developing new gasfields on the Yamal Peninsula, which are meant to provide 17 bn cfd of additional Russian production by 2020. Western Siberian production as a whole may not rise by all that much even with Yamal. The increment could be as low as 4 bn cfd, leaving another 4 bn cfd to be found from Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus to supply the additional 8 bn cfd in the scenario outlined above: all of which suggests that gas supplies in the EU will remain a problem during the next decade.

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