FOCUS
Saudi terrorist attacks spark world supply
fears
The murder and kidnapping of foreign oil workers in Saudi
Arabia have awakened fears of an
interruption in oil exports from the Kingdom coming, as these events do, on top
of earlier attacks on foreigners there.
Added to these fears is the further worry that Saudi
Arabia is close to its production capacity
and thus unable to raise exports to meet the expected rise in world
demand. Oil prices have reacted
accordingly, pushing futures markets to record levels.
For Saudi
officials, the role of the futures markets has been all-important. Many, including oil minister Ali Naimi, blame
‘speculators’ for at least part of the recent rise in prices. Shortages of gasoline in the USA
are also seen as a major contributory factor (see ‘Focus’, May 2004). Some
Saudis even cite the buying of crude oil by the US government for its Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as playing a role in pushing up prices (see ‘The Month in Brief’).
The pressure has
undoubtedly come from both sides of the demand and supply equation, but most
market concern continues to be focused on supply, and especially that from Saudi
Arabia.
As well as being the world’s largest exporter of crude oil, Saudi
Arabia is about the only major oil producer
with a significant degree of spare capacity.
Whereas world markets were able to survive the loss of Iraq’s
exports a year ago, a major reduction in Saudi supplies could not be made up by
other producers.
Saudi role
Saudi Arabia
was producing about 8.5 mn bpd in early May, of which
7.1 mn bpd were exported. It
was the main foreign supplier to the US market during 2003, with
1.7 mn bpd, accounting for nearly 18% of US crude oil imports (see Table A), though volumes have
slipped this year to 1.4 mn bpd, or 15% of the total, following a
rise in deliveries from Canada and Mexico.
It is Western Europe’s second-largest supplier of
imports, with 1.3 mn bpd or 15% of the import total in 2003, and the
largest single supplier to the OECD Pacific countries of Japan,
South Korea, Australia
and New Zealand,
accounting for 27% of all imports last year, at 1.8 mn bpd.
Most US
imports of Saudi crude consist of the country’s medium and heavy grades,
reflecting US refiners’ preference for cheaper crude oil blends. Western
Europe’s Saudi imports are primarily of light and extra-light
grades, which are often required by Europe’s less
sophisticated refineries to make increasing quantities of light products such
as diesel and gasoline (see ‘Looking
Ahead’). More than 75% of Western
Europe’s Saudi imports consist of the two lightest grades: for the
USA, the
proportion of the two light grades is about 36% (see Table B).
Table A
USA: Crude oil
imports, 2003
|
Country
|
Volume
|
Market Share
|
|
|
(th bpd)
|
(%)
|
|
Saudi Arabia
|
1,724
|
17.9
|
|
Mexico
|
1,589
|
16.4
|
|
Canada
|
1,547
|
16.0
|
|
Venezuela
|
1,193
|
12.4
|
|
Nigeria
|
838
|
8.7
|
|
Iraq
|
470
|
4.9
|
|
Angola
|
361
|
3.7
|
|
Great Britain
|
347
|
3.6
|
|
Kuwait
|
205
|
2.1
|
|
Norway
|
164
|
1.7
|
|
Others
|
1,208
|
12.5
|
|
Total
|
9,646
|
100.0
|
Source: US
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration
NB: Percentage totals rounded
The four OECD Pacific countries
import not two, but three light crude blends from Saudi
Arabia.
They too need the lightest grades for their relatively unsophisticated
refineries, compared with those of the USA. Light, extra-light and super-light crude
blends account for 75% of OECD Pacific Saudi imports.
Table B
OECD: Saudi crude imports by grade, 2003
|
Region
|
Crude blend
|
|
|
Light
|
Medium
|
Heavy
|
|
|
(%)
|
(%)
|
(%)
|
|
North
America
|
36
|
47
|
17
|
|
Europe
|
77
|
9
|
15
|
|
Pacific
|
75
|
15
|
10
|
|
Total
|
61
|
25
|
14
|
Source: International Energy Agency
NB: Percentage totals rounded
OET’s annual survey, ‘World Oil
Trade’ shows the USA
and Japan as
the main lifters of crude oil from Saudi Arabia,
with more than 1 mn bpd each.
After them, in order, come South Korea,
Singapore, China,
France and Taiwan. The Saudis are also important suppliers to South
Africa, Indonesia,
Thailand, Brazil
and Turkey.
Kingdom attacks
The attack by terrorists on a compound housing foreign oil
workers in the eastern city of al-Khobar on 29 May left 22 dead and world oil
markets in turmoil. West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) crude rose to a record high of $42.45 a barrel on the New
York futures market amid fears of instability inside Saudi
Arabia.
The assault on the compound, which was linked to al-Qaida,
was accompanied by the taking of around 50 foreign oil workers as
hostages. It was the second attack in a
month to target foreign oil workers.
Earlier, another facility at Yanbu on the west coast had been targeted,
again resulting in the deaths of foreign workers (see ‘The Month in Brief, May 2004).
Yanbu is the principal Saudi Red Sea export terminal, while al-Khobar is
close to the main Persian Gulf terminal at Ras Tanura.
There are
several terrorist groups operating inside Saudi
Arabia, not all of which are necessarily
linked with al-Qaida.
They have various aims but, in general, two causes are common to most
groups: the removal of the ruling house of Saud and its replacement with a more
severe form of Islam than that officially practised in the country. Foreign workers are being especially targeted
in the belief that they can be frightened into leaving the country, thereby
bringing about the collapse of the economy, followed by that of the ruling
house itself.
The recent
kidnappings and killings have undoubtedly spread alarm amongst the expatriate
communities in Saudi Arabia,
but their role in maintaining the production and export of oil should not be
overstated. The vast majority of the
Kingdom’s oil workers consists of Saudi nationals,
though certain important maintenance functions are carried out by foreign
technicians, many of whom are from the Indian sub-continent. Not all foreigners will leave, in any case,
if the experience of other strife-torn oil-producing countries, such as Algeria
and Colombia, is
any guide.
Perhaps the most
worrying development in Saudi Arabia
is the growing opposition to the House of Saud from people within the Kingdom,
particularly since a significant number of the regime’s opponents are drawn
from the middle class. Many of them
allege that the regime is corrupt and appoints its members and supporters to
key positions in the economy at the expense of better qualified people from the
professional classes.
Such opposition
puts the Saudi government under pressure to pursue a policy of high oil
prices. Mr Naimi has said that $27-28 a
barrel would constitute a “fair” price for the OPEC crude basket, which would
equate to a price of around $31-32 for WTI.
A WTI price of $32-33 would allow Saudi
Arabia to balance its budget; but the
government would probably want a higher level than this to allow for some
further spending designed to appeal to its discontented professional
classes. Mr Naimi said in May that
consumers could “live with” a WTI price of $35 a barrel.
Raising production
Whatever their social, political and economic problems, the
Saudis are likely to be wary of pushing for sustained price levels much above
$35, fearing that this would trigger a long term switch away from oil
consumption in the main oil-consuming countries, as well as giving a major
boost to high cost alternatives to crude oil such as oil shales and heavy
crudes (see ‘Looking Ahead’, December
2002), or gas from hydrates (see
‘Looking Ahead’, August 2003) and coal deposits (see ‘Looking Ahead’, June 2003).
Saudi
miscalculations on pricing, on the other hand, are partly responsible for the
recent high price levels. The Saudis,
along with other OPEC members, were heavily influenced by oil analysts’
predictions that oil prices would fall during the second quarter of 2004 as
world demand went into its usual seasonal decline. As a result, Saudi
Arabia backed proposals at the OPEC meeting
in Algiers on 10 February to cut
the production ceiling by 1.0 mn bpd to 23.5 mn bpd from 1
April. In the event, OPEC’s April
output, excluding that of Iraq,
was more than 2.0 mn bpd above the collective ceiling (see Table C). The announcement of a production cut
nevertheless helped to turn market psychology more bullish, especially when it
became evident that output in April was some 0.4 mn bpd below that of
the previous month.
Since then, Saudi
Arabia has announced plans to raise its
production, and OPEC itself has agreed to higher quota levels. A new concern, however, has begun to
emerge. Some commentators have begun to
raise questions about the Kingdom’s reserves and production capacity (see ‘Looking Ahead’, April 2004),
suggesting that its potential for increases in production is being
exaggerated. Despite vehement denials,
the Saudis have not been able to shake off all the doubts concerning their
future capabilities.
How much oil does Saudi Arabia
have?
Saudi Arabia
was producing about 8.5 mn bpd in early May. In late May it indicated that output was
being raised to 9.1 mn bpd. A
year ago, some industry analysts were suggesting that this was near to the
Kingdom’s maximum sustainable capacity (see
‘Global Energy Review’ on website). This
year, there have been indications that Saudi output capacity is slightly higher
than this, though commentators disagree on how much this might be.
The official
Saudi position is that production capacity is 10.5 mn bpd, though the
oil ministry admits that this level is not sustainable for more than about six
months without the drilling of additional wells. The 10.5 mn bpd figure also
includes a development of between 0.7 mn bpd and
0.8 mn bpd, which is to be commissioned this year in the Abu Safah
and Qatif area.
Beyond 2004, the
oil ministry is planning to raise output capacity to 12.0 mn bpd by
an unspecified date. After that, it may
consider a further rise, to 15.0 mn bpd. Both levels will be ‘sustainable’ levels
rather than just for production surges lasting a few months. According to the ministry, the new levels
will be capable of being sustained “for 30-50 years”.
It is these
longer term targets that are the most contentious as far as Saudi
Arabia’s critics are concerned. On the face of it, they should not present
too many difficulties given Saudi Arabia’s
estimated proven reserves of 262 bn barrels (see ‘Global Energy Review’), giving it 80
years production at existing levels.
Saudi
Arabia’s official estimates, however, are generalized
rather than being broken down by field and geological horizon. It is thus impossible to verify them
independently. These official estimates,
moreover, tend to remain unrevised for many years regardless of what level the
country has been producing. Within OPEC,
reserve figures have enormous political significance when it comes to
re-allocating production quota levels for individual countries: hence a
tendency for member-states to adopt the most optimistic estimates
available. Saudi reserves are certainly
large; but exactly how large is impossible to say without much more detailed
information on the fields, which the Saudis are most unlikely to provide.
Another way to
approach the issue is to look at the production records of the country’s main
fields. Here, again, data are scarce,
but some important conclusions may be drawn from those that are available. In the first place, the two largest fields,
Ghawar and Safaniyah, are more than 50 years old and show several signs of
maturity. One controversial assessment
presented to the Institute of Petroleum in London in February by US analyst
Matthew Simmons was that Ghawar, the country’s largest field, which accounts
for nearly 60% of Saudi production, shows every sign of being “almost depleted”
(see ‘Looking Ahead’, April
2004). Two other major Saudi fields,
Abqaiq and Berri, are also reported to be in decline.
Simmons’ case
for Ghawar rests on the increasing use of water injection to maintain pressure
in the reservoirs, and cites the fate of Oman’s
250,000 bpd Yibal field, where production fell by 65% between 1997 and
2001, following 30 years of water injection, leaving it producing 90% water and
only 10% oil. Similar, if less
spectacular declines occurred in some West Siberian fields in the 1990s. Using the Yibal analogy, Simmons states that
Ghawar’s production could fall by 30-40% over the next 3-5 years.
The West Siberian example suggests a much
less dramatic decline, but a decline nevertheless. The national oil company, Saudi Aramco,
appears to concede that parts of Ghawar are in decline, but maintains that the
field as a whole is only 48% depleted.
Yibal is, in any case, a much smaller field than the 5 mn bpd
Ghawar complex and has different geology.
The water cut at Ghawar is, in any case, much lower than in many other
areas, such as Russia,
where in some cases it exceeds 80%. The
other large fields, Safaniyah, Berri, Shaybah, Haradh and Zuluf, all have
depletion levels of less than 30%, according to Saudi Aramco. Abqaiq, on the other hand, is 73% depleted.
Saudi
Arabia may not face an immediate production
crisis but there remain some questions about the country’s longer term
prospects. In particular, it is far from
clear which fields will provide the proposed sustained output levels of
12-15 mn bpd, which Saudi Aramco appears to want to introduce within
about three years. One area that is
often mentioned in this context is the Rub al-Khali, or ‘Empty
Quarter’, in the far south of the country, but major finds there
have yet to materialize. Another
possibility is to raise recovery factors from existing fields. Saudi Aramco is to use horizontal drilling to
increase recovery levels at its 36-year-old 14 bn barrel field at
Shaybah. These so-called ‘maximum
reservoir contact’ wells are capable of increasing production, but do not
always increase recovery rates. Saudi
Arabia will probably need some large new
fields in addition to horizontal wells if it is to increase its oil production
to the levels indicated above.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabian production will
continue to be clearly scrutinized by oil market watchers. Any signs that it is approaching its
production capacity are likely to be treated with alarm: the more so since
nearly all of OPEC’s spare capacity is now concentrated in Saudi
Arabia (see
Table C).
Table C
OPEC: Spare production capacity, April 2004
|
Country
|
Output
|
Capacity
|
Spare Capacity
|
|
|
(mn bpd)
|
|
Saudi Arabia*
|
8.3
|
10.5
|
2.2
|
|
Iran
|
3.9
|
4.0
|
0.1
|
|
Venezuela
|
2.5
|
2.6
|
0.1
|
|
UAE
|
2.1
|
2.4
|
0.3
|
|
Kuwait*
|
2.2
|
2.4
|
0.2
|
|
Nigeria
|
2.3
|
2.5
|
0.2
|
|
Libya
|
1.5
|
1.5
|
0.0
|
|
Iraq
|
2.3
|
2.3
|
0.0
|
|
Algeria
|
1.1
|
1.2
|
0.1
|
|
Indonesia
|
1.0
|
1.0
|
0.0
|
|
Qatar
|
0.8
|
0.8
|
0.0
|
|
Total
|
28.0
|
31.2
|
3.2
|
*
including
half the Neutral Zone
Source: Pearl Oil estimate
THE MONTH IN BRIEF
This section summarizes downstream developments of the
previous month. Exploration &
Production are covered in ‘Upstream Review’.
High Prices, China’s rising demand and privatization under attack
Oil prices set new records on fears of an interruption to
supplies from Saudi Arabia
following a terrorist attack on a compound for foreign oil workers in
al-Khobar, which killed 22 people (see
‘Focus’). WTI rose to $42.45 a barrel
before easing on news that OPEC ministers had agreed to raise their output
ceiling by 2.0 mn bpd from 1 July.
Markets nevertheless remained tense on continuing fears of instability
in the Middle East and shortages of certain products in
parts of the USA. Exports from OPEC’s Persian Gulf
members started to rise even before the ministers agreed higher quotas in Beirut. Crude oil exports from Gulf countries rose by
about 0.5 mn bpd in May versus month-earlier levels, and Iraq’s
State Oil Marketing Organization reported May crude exports of
2.0 mn bpd, equalling the highest levels attained since last year’s
US-led invasion.
High prices for
refined products caused political trouble in various countries. Five people were killed in protests against
high fuel prices in Lebanon
just prior to the OPEC meeting, while the UK’s
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, was under pressure to cancel a
proposed rise in fuel duty due in September as road-users threatened national
protests. Gasoline prices started to
emerge as an issue in November’s presidential election in the USA,
as US markets experienced a succession of record high levels. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham ruled out
any release of government stocks to ease prices, saying that this would reduce
energy security, thereby encouraging terrorists to try and disrupt supplies to
the USA. Accessity Corporation is to create California’s
first vertically-integrated ethanol company to meet the state’s rising
oxygenate demand (see ‘Focus’, May
2004).
China
has raised domestic prices for diesel in order to damp down the increase in
demand and has begun to lift restrictions on refinery building. State-owned PetroChina is to be allowed to
double the capacity of its 200,000 bpd Dalian
refinery, whilst another government refiner, Sinopec, has received the go-ahead
for a 120,000 bpd grassroots facility on Hainan
Island. The joint-venture Wepec refinery meanwhile
has increased distillation capacity by 25% to 200,000 bpd. China’s
net imports of refined products have exceeded 1 mn bpd, as coal
shortages force the import of extra fuel oil for power stations. BP has commissioned a 2.3 mn barrel
terminal in Canton. India’s
new government has halted the privatization of the refining and retail company,
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, saying it will only sell state shareholdings
in loss-making companies in future. Papua
New Guinea has opened its first refinery: a
33,000 bpd plant at Port Moresby.
Argentina has
announced the formation of a new state energy company, Energia Argentina
(Enersa) to develop the country’s hydrocarbon resources and electricity
infrastructure, following severe shortages of gas and power this year (see ‘Gas and Power’, May 2004). The government blames private companies for
recent energy shortages. Argentina
sold the previous national oil and gas company, YPF, in the 1990s. Chile
has announced plans to import LNG in order to substitute for oil imports and
gas deliveries from Argentina,
which have been cut as a result of the energy crisis there. Peru,
like Argentina,
is debating the merits of privatization versus state ownership of the energy
industry. Oil industry trades’ unions
have called for a halt to further sales of government shareholdings in former
state companies. In a separate dispute, Peruvian
road tanker operators went on strike in a protest against new legislation
requiring them to change the way tankers are filled. Mexico
says it has scarcely any scope to increase oil exports owing to rising demand.
GAS AND POWER
New firms move into Australian gas sector
Australia’s
booming gas market continues to attract new players. Some companies, however, are not finding
success there. Several foreign firms
have managed to run up debts and are now putting their assets up for sale. These include US energy merchants, which have
lost money in other markets as well (see
‘Gas and Power’, August 2002).
Gas markets in Australia
have developed rapidly in recent years, prompted by a series of new finds and
the deregulation of gas and electricity markets, which has helped to boost
domestic demand. Gas companies, on the
other hand, have complained that state government policies do not allow them to
charge economic tariffs for transporting gas in many cases. Moreover, some large gas projects have been
unable to find sufficient customers to enable them to proceed with their
schemes. Gas producers have to contend
with the fact that most of Australia’s
gas lies in fields off the north and west of the country, while most of their
potential customers are located in the south and east of the country.
Mixed fortunes
Australia’s
gas and power sectors have provided mixed fortunes for foreign companies. Some now have assets up for sale as they seek
to pay off debts run up in Australia
and elsewhere. US
utility, Edison Mission, for example has put its Loy Yang B power station in Victoria
on the block in an attempt to pay off large debts.
Some other
companies have managed to sell Australian assets already. These include US
utility Duke Energy, which recently sold its entire Australian portfolio to
Alinta, a gas producer based in Western Australia. Duke’s assets include gas-fired power
stations at Bairnsdale, Newman and Port Headland, and
pipeline interests on both sides of the country and in Tasmania. Alinta also acquired Duke’s Glenbrook power
station in New Zealand
as part of the same deal.
Two other US
firms involved in recent asset sales are Dominion and El
Paso, which between them held 89% of debt-ridden Epic
Energy. Epic has sold its pipeline
network in South Australia and
neighbouring states and now plans to dispose of its Dampier to Bunbury pipeline
in Western Australia. Epic bought the line from the government of Western
Australia in 1998 but has since experienced a series
of regulatory problems. In 2002, for
example, the state’s access regulator ordered a 30% cut in tariffs, threatening
the pipeline’s commercial future, until Epic was able to have the ruling
overturned by the state’s Supreme Court (see ;Focus’, November 2002).
Fears about further adverse regulatory rulings have almost certainly
slowed down the sale of the pipeline.
There has nevertheless been considerable interest in the sale from
Australian companies.
Some non-US
assets are also reported to be up for sale, including Hong Kong’s
CLP’s stake in the Yallourn power station.
While most of the interest in this and other gas and power assets comes
from Australian firms, foreign interest in Australia
has not entirely dried up. Malaysia’s
Genting has been linked with the proposed sale of Yallourn power station, and
at least one US
utility, TXU, is rumoured to be looking for new assets in the gas and power
sectors. Canada’s
Enbridge was part of a consortium bidding for Duke
assets and other potential investors in various Australian pipeline projects
are Singapore Power and Malaysia’s
Ranhill.
Australian firms expand
A number of Australian gas and power companies have used the
recent round of asset sales as a means of expanding their activities. The former state-owned Western Australian gas
producer, Alinta, for example, has used the Duke Energy disposals to give it a
major foothold outside its home market in the rapidly expanding markets in the
east of the country. Last year, it
acquired a series of assets when another US
company, Aquila, quit the Australian market.
Another
Australian company with plans to expand via a series of acquisitions is Origin
Energy, the country’s second-largest retailer of gas and electricity. Origin also has some gas production in Australia
and New Zealand
and is now seeking to add electricity generation to its portfolio, having
bought a power station in Queensland
last year.
Among other
Australian companies on the acquisition trail are the Australian Gas Light
Company (AGL), Australian Pipeline Trust (APT) and GasNet. AGL, already the country’s largest energy
retailer has said that it wants to expand its power generation activities. One project already under consideration is
the doubling of capacity at its 215 MW gas-fired power station at Hallett
in South Australia, where there are
local shortages of generating capacity.
APT wants to increase its already strong position in gas transmission,
though it may encounter opposition from the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission if it tries to expand too aggressively.
Traditional gas
companies are now starting to face competition from companies producing natural
gas from coal seams. Several projects to
produce coal-bed methane (CBM) are under way, including Sydney Gas, which is to
develop deposits in New South Wales
capable of supplying up to 10% of Sydney’s
gas requirements. Most of the city’s gas
comes from South Australia, but
supplies were interrupted earlier this year by a fire and explosion at the
Moomba gas processing plant. Elsewhere
in Australia,
Queensland Gas is planning to supply CBM to Brisbane. Queensland Gas is one of a number of CBM
companies floated over the last few years.
Earlier this year, another one, Karoon Gas Australia,
announced a new share issue to fund developments in the Latrobe
Valley coalfield in Victoria.
To some extent,
the newer, smaller companies appear to be leaving some of the older, larger
firms behind. Some of the latter have
become bogged-down in high profile projects such as the Greater Sunrise field,
where development is being delayed by an offshore boundary dispute between Australia
and East Timor, and a project to build a pipeline between
Papua New Guinea
and Queensland, which has
encountered difficulties in signing up sufficient customers for the gas.
LOOKING AHEAD
EU fuel oil proposals threaten small refiners
Proposals by the EU to reduce the sulphur content of marine heavy
fuel oil are causing alarm amongst smaller refiners, some of whom fear they may
not be able to meet the new specifications.
Refiners are already having to reduce sulphur
levels in diesel and gasoline to comply with new lower limits in both Europe
and the USA (see ‘Focus’, May 2004).
Refiners use
various forms of hydrogen-treating in order to reduce sulphur levels in
distillate fuels such as diesel. The
hydrogen comes as a by-product from reformer units, which are used to convert
naphtha into gasoline. Refineries
normally have sufficient hydrogen with which to run their desulphurization
units, which are used primarily to reduce the sulphur content of diesel.
Refineries
operating on this basis produce light, low sulphur products such as gasoline
and diesel, but they are also left with residues and other intermediate
products that are high in sulphur. These
are normally disposed of via the fuel oil pool, the fuel oil itself being a
blend of heavy residues and lighter liquids.
The sulphur limit for fuel oil used in ships’ bunkers is 3.5% in many
parts of the world, including much of Europe, providing
a valuable outlet for refiners’ excess sulphur.
New limits
The European Commission now wants to reduce this upper limit
to 1.5% for all vessels in the North Sea and the Baltic,
with a further requirement for fuel used in port areas to have a limit of
0.2%. The new specifications are
expected to come into effect in about 2006 or 2007, depending on how long it
takes for them to be ratified.
Large refineries
already desulphurize their heavy residues, in addition to hydro-treating their
middle distillate. Smaller refiners, on
the other hand, often lack both the capital to invest in residue desulphurizing
units and the hydrogen with which to operate them. A further problem for many European refiners
is that their crude slate is becoming higher in sulphur as North Sea
oil production declines, forcing them to import a higher proportion of sour
crudes from the Middle East and Russia.
Fuel oil markets
Marine bunker fuel consumption in the EU is about
550,000 bpd. Of this, about
200,000 bpd is accounted for by North Sea and
Baltic shipping. At present, there are
two main fuel oil grades traded in Europe: low sulphur
fuel oil (LSFO), which has a sulphur limit of 1.0%, and high sulphur fuel oil
(HSFO), where the limit is 3.5%. LSFO
normally commands a price premium over HSFO of between $20 and $30 a tonne.
The extra cost of residue desulphurization are expected to widen this
price differential to $50 or more per tonne.
Some bunkering operations in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA)
region fear that shipowners will limit their purchases there to the minimum level
required for voyages in northern Europe and top-up with
cheaper 3.5% sulphur material in other ports to cover the parts of their
journeys outside the North Sea and Baltic. ARA is Europe’s
largest bunkering centre. HSFO would
continue to be available in the Mediterranean and from Persian
Gulf ports such as Fujairah in the
UAE. The Gulf represents growing
challenge to traditional bunkering centres such as ARA and Singapore.
The two-tier
bunker market may nevertheless not be a permanent feature of the fuel oil
business. If the EU were to go ahead
with its 1.5% limit, other regions might well follow suit. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
is promoting the idea of a global limit of 1.5% for ships’ bunker fuel.
Lower limits?
The IMO’s proposals would create still further problems for
small refiners, some of which are already struggling to meet sulphur limits on
automotive diesel. The various proposals
on bunker fuels create uncertainties for all refiners since there is as yet no
clear timetable for the introduction of the new measures, or even an indication
of what sulphur level will finally be adopted.
Members of the European Parliament, for example, have indicated that
they will propose a much more severe limit of 0.5% when the European Commission’s
proposals are debated later this year.
The argument is unlikely to be resolved before 2005; the shipping
industry will then be given a further year to comply with the new limits.
Refiners of all
sizes have complained of the high cost of producing cleaner fuels. Figures from the USA,
however, suggest that the capital costs associated with desulphurization,
although high, may well have been overstated.
The US
refining industry initially estimated the capital cost of reducing the sulphur
level un diesel from 500 parts per million (ppm) to 15
ppm in 2006 at $9-10bn (see ‘Focus’,
October 2003). New studies indicate the
cost could be less than $5bn, thanks to improvements in catalysts that allow
existing desulphurization units to be run at higher throughput levels.
On the other
hand, the logistical costs of new sulphur regulations may well have been
underestimated. The US
diesel limits will allow a tolerance of only 2 ppm above the 15 ppm
limit. While refiners might produce material
within this limit, there are fears that product could be put off-specification
by contamination from pipelines, barges, road tankers and railcars. Thus ultra-low sulphur diesel might have to
be reprocessed before it could be delivered to filling station tanks.
UPSTREAM REVIEW
Western Hemisphere
Discoveries and Agreements
USA: Kerr-McGee has announced that its offshore Ticonderoga
discovery could contain reserves of 30-50 mn boe. The field lies under 5,250 feet of water in
the Gulf of Mexico and will probably be developed in
conjunction with the nearby Constitution field.
USA: Pioneer Natural Resources is to acquire
Evergreen Resources for $2.1 bn, to be paid for with 25 mn shares and
$850 mn cash. Evergreen is based in
the Rocky Mountains and its acquisition will give the
combined firm reserves of 6.2 trillion cf natural gas equivalent.
USA: ExxonMobil has sold oil and gas properties in
Wyoming and West Texas
to US
independent XTO for $335 mn. XTO
has already bought upstream assets in North and East Texas,
Oklahoma, Louisiana
and Arkansos this year. The latest deal involves 38 mn bbl
of oil and 7,000 bpdoe.
Canada: Murphy Oil is selling its western Canadian oil
and gas properties to two Canadian firms, Canadian Natural Resources and Pengrowth for $610 mn.
The deal includes producing and undeveloped acreage.
Colombia: Occidental has extended its Cravo Norte agreement with state
company Ecopetrol for 10 years to 2018. The deal is aimed at helping to slow down the
decline in Colombian output, now 0.5 mn bpd versus
0.8 mn bpd in 1999. Oxy will
invest $210 mn in Cravo Norte
between now and 2010; Ecopetrol’s share is around
$55 mn.
Brazil: State-owned Petrobras is to spend $54 bn
over the next six years in an attempt to raise proven reserve levels by one
third to 19 bn boe and boost production
from 1.5 mn bpd to 2.3 mn bpd, transforming the country
into a net exporter of 0.5 mn bpd by 2010 versus net imports of
0.2 mn bpd now.
Pipelines
USA: ConocoPhillips has sold processing gas plants
and the 75-mile Raptor pipeline together with associated gas-gathering
pipelines to Duke Energy Field Services (DEFS) for $74 mn. The pipeline and processing system handles
110 mn cfd.
Europe
Discoveries and Agreements
UK: British independent Intrepid Energy has sold
its 29.9% share of the Buzzard oil field for $840 mn to Petro-Canada. Buzzard’s reserves are put at
1.2 bn barrels, making it the UK’s
largest discovery in the last 10 years.
It is due on stream in 2006 and could be producing 0.2 mn bpd
by 2008, equal to 10% of the UK’s
expected production then. Buzzard’s
other shareholders are EnCana, operator (43.2%), BG
(21.7%) and Edinburgh Oil and Gas (5.2%).
UK: Shell has made a fourth downward revision of
its proven reserves of 103 mn boe. The revisions have cut end-2002 reserve
estimates by a total of 23% to 14.9 bn boe,
angering shareholders and leading to high level resignations (see ‘The Month in Brief’, May 2004).
Netherlands: Work has begun on the 450 bn cf
offshore F16-E gas field. Production is
expected to begin in 2006 at 150 mn cfd.
Middle East
Discoveries and Agreements
Iraq: Sonoran Energy of
the USA has
submitted bids to raise production of the Kirkuk
field by 0.1 mn bpd and to develop a 60,000 bpd field at Hamrin between Kirkuk
and Baghdad. Kirkuk’s output is in decline (see ‘Focus’, January 2004).
Iran: OMV has begun drilling the onshore Mehr block in the Zagros region
of southern Iran. The company says it will decide on whether
the block is commercial after drilling ends in about mid-August.
Pipelines
Iraq: Iraq
is to renew a 30-mile section of the 1.2 mn bpd export pipeline from
the Kirkuk field, between Taji and Ceyhan in Turkey. Some 4,000 tons of pipe
have been delivered to northern Iraq
by Jordanian contractors al-Iman. The line was closed as a result of sabotage
in mid-May.
Iran: Iran
has raised the capacity of the pipeline connecting Neka
on the Caspian to Tehran from
50,000 bpd to 170,000 bpd. The
line is used to take crude oil from Russia,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
to refineries at Tehran and Tabriz. Iran
exports an equivalent value on behalf of the three suppliers via the Persian
Gulf (see ‘World Energy
Review’ on website).
Africa
Discoveries and Agreements
Nigeria: The government has ended bonus payments to
oil companies. Firms were rewarded for
identifying extra reserves but there have been disputes recently over the size
of some payments. Some companies say the
scrapping of the bonuses will slow down exploration.
Nigeria: ChevronTexaco is to delay the resumption of
output from fields in Delta state following the murder of seven employees
there. More than 0.1 mn bpd
has been shut-in as a result of communal violence.
Nigeria: China’s
Sinopec has signed three-year service contracts for two offshore blocks in the
Niger Delta, numbers 64 and 66.
State-owned NPDC wants to raise its offshore output from its current
25,000 bpd level and the Chinese government is keen to establish an
upstream presence in West Africa.
Nigeria/Sao Tome and Principe: The first acreage award in the joint development
zone (JDZ) between Nigeria
and Sao Tome and Principe
has been awarded. Block 1 was awarded to
ChevronTexaco, operator (51%), ExxonMobil (40%) and Equity Energy Resources
(9%). Revenues from the JDZ will be
split 60:40 in favour of Nigeria. Further awards have been held up by wrangles over
upstream terms.
Gabon: US
independent Vaalco Energy is to raise the output of
its Etame field later this year by up to
8,000 bpd to 23,000 bpd following a new find in May. A further rise of about 10,000 bpd is
slated for 2005.
Mauritania: Australia’s
Woodside Petroleum has been awarded the operatorship of Mauritania’s
first oil field. The
120 mn bbl offshore Chinguetti field is
expected on stream in March 2005.
Woodside will have a 54% share of the field, followed by Australian
independents Hardman Resources (22%) and Roc Oil (4%) together with BG (12%)
and Premier Oil (9%) from the UK. Woodside may develop a second oil find at Tiof by 2008 and a gas discovery at Banda.
Morocco: Shell has begun drilling its deepwater
acreage in the Agadir-Tarfaya basin off southern Morocco. The area has been described as ‘promising’
and Shell and other companies have been encouraged by new tax breaks for
offshore exploration.
Equatorial Guinea: The country’s new national oil company, GEpetrol, has signed a production-sharing contract covering
offshore Block O with US Noble Energy (45%) and Swiss Glencore
(25%). GEpetrol,
with 30%, is down as the operator, but will rely on Noble for technical
assistance.
Asia/Pacific
Discoveries and Agreements
China: Norway’s
Statoil is to prolong production at the offshore Lufeng
field until 2008, reversing a decision to cease output in August. Statoil will use sidetrack drilling to raise
production from 6,000 to 10,000 bpd.
Statoil owns 75% of the field, CNOOC the remaining 25%.
China/Japan: JNOC has sold three 50% stakes in Chinese oil
ventures to other Japanese companies as part of a government scheme to wind up
the state company by next year. Its
stake in the Japex New Nanhai
venture was sold to Japan Petroleum Exploration, while its New Huanan Oil Development shareholding went to AOC and its NMC
Pearl River Mouth Oil Development stake to Japan Energy. The sales realised $88 mn.
New Zealand: Genesis Power has agreed to purchase New
Zealand Oil and Gas’s (NZOG) production from the offshore Kupe
field, which is due to start producing gas in 2007. It will also contribute up to $40 mn of NZOG’s development costs.
NZOG has a 15% share of the field.
South Korea/North Korea: South Korea’s
state-owned Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) is considering participating
in the development of a field off Nampo,
North Korea. Pyongyang
has claimed offshore reserves of up to 40 bn bbl, though this is a
wild exaggeration. Energy links between
the two halves of the Korean peninsula are tentative and unofficial at present.
CIS/FSU
Discoveries and Agreements
Russia: State-run Rosneft
has submitted requests for 19 new exploration licences, 11 of which are close
to the 1 bn bbl Vankor field in Eastern
Siberia. Rosneft currently produces 0.4 mn bpd of oil and
675 mn cfd of gas.
Russia/Uzbekistan: Lukoil is negotiating with the Uzbek state
oil and gas company Uzbekneftegaz for a 70% share of the Kandymsky
gas field, the largest field in an area said to contain 8 trillion cf
of gas. Uzbekneftegaz will have the
remaining 30%. The gas will have to be
exported via Russia
(see ‘Global Energy Review’).
Pipelines
Kazakhstan: First oil from the Karachaganak field has
been shipped via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s 140,000 bpd pipeline to
Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. The pipeline was opened last year then shut
following contamination. Initial flows
of 50,000 bpd are expected to rise to 120,000 bpd by December (see ‘Global Energy Review’).